Review of : Hellenistic Infantry Reform in the 160s B.C.

Book Cover Art

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to review Hellenisitic Infantry Reform in the 160s BC, by Nicholas Sekunda, a professor at the University of Gdansk. Published in 2001, this book makes an  argument that around 160 B.C.E., the Ptolemaic and Seleucid Kingdom's reformed their armies along the lines of the Roman Republic. Previously, according to Sekunda, the mainstay of the heavy infantry in these armies had been sarissa phalanxes, but around 160, they began adopt Roman manipular tactics.

 

The components of the Roman infantry around B.C.E. 200

The first portion of Sekunda's work deals with Ptolemaic Egypt, and this should not be surprising, as nearly every part of the Ptolemaic state is better historically attested than its Seleucid counterpart. Sekunda's evidence is formidable: he draws on several Stele from Hermopolis, These Stele record unit officers and organization for the Hermopolis garrison. From the organization on the Stele, it appears that these troops where the organized along the lines of a Roman maniple, rather than a sarrisa phalanx. Also draws on a number of archaeological sources, including tombstones, like that of Salmas of Adada (on the book cover, above) and Dioskourides of Balboura (below). 

Sekunda also uses the Kasr el Harit shield in order to make his case that Ptolemaic infantry had adopted Roman tactics on a large scale.  This shield found in Egypt, matches Polybius' description of a Roman Scutum. (Poly. 6.23. 2-5) Based on the artifacts found in proximity to it, the shield dates in the late 2nd Century B.C.E., around the time of Sekunda's claimed reform. Peter Connolly's drawing of the shield is below. 

Peter Connolly's rendition of the Kasr el Harit shield

On the whole, Sekunda convinces the reader that on some level, after 160 B.C.E., the Ptolemaic army did perhaps adopt units in the Roman style. However, he runs into trouble when he attempts to claim more broadly about the Seleucid army in the same period. Using Polybius' descriptions of the army of Seleucid King Antiochus IV from the parade at Daphne, Sekunda argues that the 5,000 men "armed in the Roman fashion" were a test unit subsequently adopted by the entirety of the Seluecid army. 

His evidence for this comes from the fact that at the Battle of Beth-Zachariah, in 162 B.C.E. the Seleucid army appears to have been operating in a flexible manner, which would better fit a Roman maniple than a sarrisa phalanx. However, here, Hellenistic Infantry Reform runs aground. The author of I Maccabees, who describes the Battle of Beth Zachariah, refers to the disposition of the Seleucid War-Elephants, saying, "they distributed the beasts among the phalanxes, with every Elephant being assigned a thousand men." (καὶ διεῖλον τὰ θηρία εἰς τὰς φάλαγγας καὶ παρέστησαν ἑκάστῳ ἐλέφαντι χιλίους ἄνδρας τεθωρακισμένους ἐν ἁλυσιδωτοῖς) (I Macc. 6.35)

Sekunda argues that the description of the soldiers in the phalanx is more in keeping with a Roman legionary, each of these thousand men assigned to the Elephants, "had coats of mail, and helmets of brass." Sekunda commits a number of possible errors here: first of all, he assumes that the phalanxes and the thousand men assigned to each elephant are one and the same, which is not grammatically clear. Is it not possible that these soldiers could be a portion of the "Romanized Infantry," mentioned at the parade of Daphne? Or, equally likely, that these men were Thorakites, a type of armed infantrymen who used a shield and thorax who were previously included in Seleucid armies?

If the author of Maccabees explicitly states that the elephants were distributed among the phalanxes (φάλαγγας) should we not take him at his word? Sekunda argues that in this case, "phalanxes" simply means infantrymen, but later, when describing Plutarch's account of a Armenian army, he insists that the statement, (τῶν μὲν εἰς σπείρας, τῶν δ᾽ εἰς φάλαγγας συντεταγμένων,) means that the Armenian army was a literal mix of cohorts and phalanxes. It seems to me that it would be more historically responsible to assume that there was an actual phalanx present at Beth Zachariah.

Though failing to convince fully when describing Seleucid military reform, Sekunda has amply succeeded showing that the late Hellenistic armies were more complex and adaptable than has previously been thought. He is at his best when using solid literary and archaeological evidence, particularly when describing the Ptolemaic and very late Hellenistic armies used by Pontus and Armenia. If you are interested in the armies of the Hellenistic world or the military systems that Caesar and Pompey faced, this book is for you!

Thanks for reading,

Alex Burns

The Battle of Coronea, 394

Peter Connolly's imagining of Coronea

Dear Reader,

Today, we are going to apply the lens of what we have previously established about Hoplites- that they did not charge into battle before Marathon, and most Hoplite armies aside from the Spartans adopted this advance after Marathon, to an in-depth analysis of the Battle of Coronea as described by Xenophon. At Coronea, a Spartan army with its allies met a Boeotian and Argive force on a plain. The Spartans on the right wing of their allied army, opposite the Argives, while the Thebans were on the right of their army, opposite the Spartan allies. 

The armies approached each other in silence until they were around 600 feet apart, (maybe a bit more or less depending on which Stade Xenophon means), after which the Thebans, "came on racing." (Θηβαῖοι δρόμῳ ὁμόσε ἐφέροντο.) Here, the Thebans employ the second method of advancing as discussed in the previous post. The Spartans and their allies continued to advance evenly, until about 300 feet apart (three plethra) the troops in the center of the Spartan line: Ionian, Aeolian, and Hellespontine Spartan allies, "charged out of (King) Agesilaos'  battle line...and advanced together at the run." (ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου φάλαγγος ... καὶ πάντες οὗτοι τῶν συνεκδραμόντων τε ἐγένοντο.) When these Spartan allies reached the enemy line (probably part of the Argive contingent), their opponents fled after a brief contact. The Argive troops directly opposite the Spartans did not make contact the Spartans, but instead fled back the way they had come, towards Mount Helicon. However, the charge of the Thebans had smashed into the opposite end of the Spartan line, where the Orchomenains, Spartan allies, were stationed, breaking through this part of the Spartan army. 

At this point, both the Spartan contingent and the Theban contingent wheeled to face the other. One modern translation indicates that the Thebans, "massed themselves and approached boldly." (Strassler, Landmark Xenophon, 138) The exact language is "συσπειραθέντες ἐχώρουν ἐρρωμένως." (Xen Hellenica 4.3.18) This could be translated to say that the Thebans, "formed  in order and approached with vigor." Was this a running charge? Xenophon's language is unclear, so it is impossible to say with certainty. I would argue that it was, based on the following description of events. 

It now, in the second phase of the engagement that Xenophon gives his famous passage, that the combatants, "Crashed their shields together, shoved, fought, killed, and died, and in the end, some of the Thebans broke through to Mount Helicon, many were killed..." To me, this seems a perfectly reasonable result if a phalanx charging at the run met a ordered Spartan phalanx head-on. We see both that the Thebans appear to have taken more causalities and lost the battle, but also that groups of Thebans were able to drive into the Spartan phalanx and break its cohesion, moving through to join the Argives as Mount Helicon.  

However, in the interest of fairness, the battle can certainly be imagined another way, with the Thebans advancing at a slower pace to meet the Spartan onslaught. This is certainly how Peter Connolly envisioned the battle when drawing the picture above. In  Surely if both advanced slowly, the Spartans and Thebans would have advanced with order, which accounts for Xenophon's description of the Theban line reforming. In such an instance, however, why would shields be the first thing to crash? Also, unless the phalanxes became mixed, how can we account for groups of Thebans breaking through the Spartan line to reach the Argives at Mount Helicon? If the Spartans did not break, (which doesn't seem likely, considering that they won the battle) then in parts of the line, the Thebans must have killed large numbers of them, which Xenophon does not mention. If the Thebans engaged in othismos mass shoving to push through the Spartans, surely they would have won the battle? 

Xenophon, who had an immense amount of soldierly experience, would have been aware of jarring impact of two aspis in the moment of contact. His language cannot be taken as a literary device, but an actual description of events as they played out. In battles where the Hoplites advanced to battle at the run, they would have been too disordered to engaging in mass shoving at the moment of impact as Thucydides indicates at Mantinea. Since ancient sources clearly depict Hoplites charging at the run after Marathon, in my mind, mass shoving cannot be the only way Hoplites engaged one another, even if, in all likelihood, it is described in some battles.  

Thanks for reading,

Alex Burns 

The Two Methods of Hoplite Advance

Hoplites in formation, possibly Etruscan

Dear Reader,



In this post, I want to examine the two methods by which Greek Hoplites moved into battle. Herodotus noted that the Greek army at Marathon were the first Hoplites ever to charge into battle at a running pace, and both textual evidence (from later Spartan armies who still advanced slowly) and pictoral evidence, (from the Chigi Vase dating to the 640s B.C.E.,) supports his statement.


First, let us examine the evidence which comes down about the slow and orderly advance in a phalanx. Describing the peculiar method of the Spartan advance, Thucydides indicated that this was done, "without breaking order, as large armies are apt to do in the moment of engaging." (Thuc. 5.70, as translated in Strassler, Landmark Thucydides, 343.) In these early Hoplite engagements, perhaps fought between 650 and 500, we should imagine skirmishers and cavalry playing a role, as indeed, they seem to do against Kleomenes in 511-510. (Hdt. 5.62-64.) As two opposing phalanxes approached each other, still at an even pace,  they would come within what Xenophon might call "spear-reach" (εἰς δόρυ ἀφικόμενοι). Here, as depicted on the Chigi vase, while standing close together, as Thucydides tells us they did, and Tyrtaeus exhorts them to, they would fight with spears, and hoping to force the other side to break. This type of fighting would have been very hard on the spears, leading to much breakage, as dory heads became embedded in enemy bodies, shields, and armor, and disarmed opposing men desperately would have tried to defend themselves by seizing or disabling enemy spears.  It is somewhat telling, at least in my mind, that Herodotus describes Greek spears breaking twice- at Thermopylae, and at Platea. In both of these circumstances, there is no mention of a run at the enemy, only that they advanced (χωρέω). In this type of battle, Hoplites engage slowly with spears before the breakage of spears forces an engagement at much closer quarters. Herodotus' description of Platea makes this clear: the Greeks began an othismos when the Persians had disabled their spears. In a battle where Hoplites marched into battle, the, as Bardunias puts it, the storm of spears preceded the press of shields.With the exception of the Athenians at Marathon, this would be way which the Greeks engaged the Persians, and would been representative of some of the intra-Hoplite clashes before Marathon.  

This would have been a terrifying experience for the enemies of the Spartans. Many Hoplites were understandably wary of engaging the Spartans, even when they advanced slowly and so we see reports of armies fleeing before contact is even made. Both Thucydides (at Mantinea in 418) and Xenophon (at the "tearless battle" in 368) recorded that only a few of enemy forces waited to face them in a battle of spears. At Mantinea, it looks as though only one side advanced, as Thucydides describes the Spartan and Argive contingents advancing at different rates of speed, but says nothing about their enemies movements. At the "tearless battle",  Xenophon informs us that the Spartan army was ready to charge the enemy, but had to be prevented from doing so by their officers. Once again, the Spartan's enemies at the "tearless battle" appear to have awaited the Spartan advance. (Thuc. 5.69-5.72, Xen Hellenica 7.1.31)

When two armies advanced at the run towards each other at the run, there cannot be, in my mind, any notion of them slowing before impact, as suggested by Paul Bardunias. If a large mass of men truly advanced at a run, as ancient sources suggest, they cannot have stopped to engage in spear fighting before coming into close physical contact with one another. With such a large number of men running, apparently at their top speed, men in front would be unable to slow down without impeding and even being trampled by those behind. Once masses of men commit to moving forward, they generally do not stop when small numbers at the front begin to have second thoughts. In this type of engagement, the hoplites would have slammed together, mixing the two armies. We can see worries about this mixing in the Spartan hesitation to advance to the attack at the run. Thucydides informs us that Spartans wished to avoid (μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις), "ripping apart their order," in the moment of engaging with the enemy.

 An excellent example of this type of clash is at Delium in 424. Here, Thucydides indicates that both the Athenians and Boeotians came on at a run, and at the first impact, spears are not mentioned, only shields. The Landmark Thucydides translates the passage, "the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield." (Strassler, pg. 275) However, Thucydides is language is interesting- he states that upon coming together, the armies, "pushed shields." (ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων). (Thuc. 4.96.2) This should not necessarily be surprising, as charging at the run over significant distances with spears in the overarm (in my opinion, the more likely) or underarm thrusting positions would have been difficult, to say the least. This is further supported by Xenophon's statements regarding the running charge at Cunaxa in 401, when he states that the Greeks clashed their spears against their shields while on the charge- something that would not make much sense if the Hoplites charged with spears presented.(Xen. Anabasis 1.8.18.)  With the spears in an upright position during advance, as the Chigi vase shows the back ranks, the first thing to crash together my well have been the shields of opposing men. This idea is supported by the word order in Xenophon's description of Coronea, when the opposing phalanxes, "crashing their shields together, they shoved, fought, killed, and were killed."  (Xen Hellenica 4.3.18-19) In Xenophon's text, it is no clearer whether the men are engaging in mass scrumming, or physically pushing individual enemies away in an effort to use their weapons.  The word order, however, is clear- crashing of shields, followed by shoving, and then fighting. In a battle when Hoplites engaged one another at the run, then, it is possible that the press of shields preceded the storm of spears. 

We can see all of these aspects of Hoplite warfare in one of the most well document Hoplite clashes, the Battle of Coronea in 394, which we will examine in the next post.

Thanks for reading,



Alex Burns 

Hoplite Battle, the Speed of Advance, and The Nature of Othismos

Some present-day Hoplites advancing quickly. Photo by Ana Belen Rubio

Dear Reader,


Today we ask the question, what was combat between two opposing Hoplite Phalanxes like? Historians generally fall into two positions on this issue, although a third group is starting to emerge. These camps find different meaning in the Greek word ώθίσμός (othismos):  pushing/thrusting. To the ancient Greeks, othismos could mean both literal shoving, or be used in figuratively, as in "the thrust of his argument." Othismos was a very common word, used by ancient authors in a variety of situations.

 The literal model, or orthodox view, maintains that Hoplite combat unfolded like a game of rugby, with groups of opposing Hoplites massed 8 or more deep pushing in an effort to gain ground from the enemy. For historians who subscribe to this model, the Greek term othismos describes literal pushing by massed groups of Hoplites.  In this view, soldiers both fought and pushed on each other, leading to causalities as men were stabbed by spears and crushed by the weight (perhaps  asphyxiated and unable to breathe) of the opposing phalanxes. The unique shape of a Hoplite's sheild would have prevented him from being crushed or asphyxiated, as has recently been shown.  (Bardunias, Ancient Warfare Magazine, 2011) This view, then, takes Xenophon's account of the Battle of Coronea literally, when according to a recent translation, "Crashing together their shields, they shoved, they fought, they killed and were killed..."( καὶσυμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνῃσκον.) Another passable translation of the first part might be: "they threw their shields together."(Ed. Strassler, Landmark Hellenica, 138/ Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.3.19.) 

By contrast, the figurative model, sometimes called the heretical view, argues that our understandings of Hoplite phalanx combat are incorrect. In reality, according to these scholars,  Hoplite combat occurred in a more spread out fashion, with combatants using their weapons with plenty of space between them. Suggested by Peter Krentz and others, this viewpoint used common sense to indicate that 10,000 men in a rugby scrum might not be the most realistic way to envision Greek battle- as physics might interfere. If the pressure was constant from both sides, then a battle might be maintained, but textual records from ancient Greek sources indicate that battles often broke down into localized encounters, not one unified push. (Krentz, "The Nature of Hoplite Battles, Classical Antiquity, 1985.)

 A third view has also developed, arguing that pushing developed after a series of loose order duels. Perhaps best expressed in an article by G. L. Cawkwell, this viewpoint has attempted to fuse both camps. In order to make this claim, Cawkell used a number of non-traditional sources, such as writings from Plato and Socrates, to show that use of weapons did occur on the Hellenic battlefield. (Cawkwell, "Orthodoxy and Hoplites," Classical Quarterly, 1989.)  Many historians find this view implausible, as Garrett Fagan has argued in his course on Ancient Battles for the Teaching Company, because how would Hoplites know when these distinct phases of the engagement where occurring?

It may seem that these views might be irreconcilable, because they have arrived at very different conclusions while utilizing the same source base. However, without question, written historical accounts remain our best tool for understanding the past, rather than experimental archaeology, and image analysis. Both of these useful tools should be employed by historians in understanding the past, but should not be the main vehicle for doing so. With that being said, let us attempt to reconstruct the phases of how a Hoplite battle occurred.

Chigi Vase, Louvre

After the completion of pre-battle rituals, in most circumstances, one or both armies would advance towards one another. (Hdt. 9.62, Thuc. 6.69, Xen. Hellenica 7.1.31.) These armies, which by the 5th-4th centuries B.C.E., usually numbered 10,000 men or more often advanced into battle at the run.  (Thuc. 5.70, Xen. Hellenica 4.3.17.)  This was a relatively recent phenomenon, as Herodotus tells us about the Greek Hoplites at Marathon: "They were the first Greeks that I know of who went into battle at the run." (πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν δρόμῳ ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο,) (Hdt. 6.112.3) We know that at least by the time of the Battle of Mantinea in 418, the Spartans still did not advance into the battle in this way, and by 394, there is circumstantial evidence from the Battle of Coronea that they still did not. (Thuc. 5.70, Xen Hellenica, 4.3.17) Rather, Thucydides informs us that the Spartans advanced slowly to the music of flute players. If the Chigi Vase does indeed depict Hoplites from the 640s, it may support this method of slowly advancing into battle as being an older method of Hoplite combat. While the second rank on the Chigi vase appears to be running, this may well be a stylized device, a chance to depict the beauty of the Hoplites body. If the Chigi vase does indeed present running Hoplites, there would be no need for the flute player to keep time.  Since the Spartans may have been loathe to accept new methods of Hoplites advancing, this may show a sharp distinction between how Hoplites advanced before and after Marathon.  I would submit this theory as quite tentative, and open to debate.It should be realized- I do not view the Spartans as hide-bound and unimaginative. The decisions of Brasidas at Amphipolis or Kleomenes at Sepeia quickly prove such ideas incorrect.

We can now envision two scenarios: 1) the slower early Hoplite clash, where two groups of Hoplites advanced slowly, to the playing of flutes, and 2) the later running method, seemingly prevalent in most non-Spartan Hoplite forces after Marathon. In the next post, we will compare these two different manners of Hoplite advance, and what battles between them might have looked like.


Thanks for Reading,


Alex Burns

Infantry Warfare in the Greek World: A Broad Overview

At Spartan Hoplite at rest, Peter Connolly

Dear Reader,

As historians and scientists often note, I am only able to compose this work because, in a figurative sense, I stand on the soldiers of intellectual giants. Our understanding of conflict in the ancient world advanced by leaps and bounds in the twentieth century, as a result of the life's work of dedicated ancient world specialists. The work of individuals like Peter Connolly, Donald Kagan, Adrian Goldsworthy, Victor Davis Hanson, Robert Strassler  and other individuals less well known, like Paul Bernard, Bezalel Bar-Kochva, Nick Secunda, Angelos Chaniotis, and Paul Bardunias come together to make our knowledge of the Classical Greek and Hellenistic warfare possible. I am grateful to be able to contribute to this in a tiny way.

In this post, I want to briefly outline two types of infantry soldier we will encounter in the Greek world, how they are different, and what makes them distinct. Before continuing- realize, much like today, there were many different types of soldiers present in the Greek - this is not a comprehensive list, nor should these types of soldiers necessarily be viewed as the main or most important type of ancient Greek soldier. However, they are perhaps the most distinct and recognizable.

1. όπλίτης (heavily armed soldier, or Hoplite)

This type of soldier emerged in the sometime in the 700s or 600s B.C.E. As pictured above, the Hoplite armed himself with a six foot long spear (δόρυ, or "dory") and a large, domed circular shield about 3 feet in diameter, an ασπίς (aspis). It is interesting to note that in a military context, the aspis referred to the left, while the dory referred to the right. These men fought together in a military formation called a Phalanx, which, to prevent it from being confused with a second type of phalanx discussed below, we will call a Hoplite phalanx. Historians continue to debate the exact nature of combat between two of these opposing forces, something we will be coming on to in a future post.

So, in the early period of Greek history, from around 700-350 B.C.E. this type of soldier fought, apparently in formations between 8 (the norm) and 25 (the exception) men deep. Despite images like the one above, and portrayals in film, there was little "uniform" about these warriors. Some fought in metal and leather armor, others wore linen tunics, some appear to have even fought nude. Perhaps the most famous Greek army, the Spartans, standardized their forces in two ways: by the year 400 B.C.E., Spartan forces wore red cloaks, and had a stylized capital Greek letter Lambda (Λ, for the Spartan homeland, Λακεδαίμων, Lakedaemon.) To be a good Hoplite meant standing in the formation with your fellow citizens, and defeating the enemy through combined effort. This is evident, as after the Battle of Platea, the Spartans ignored a soldier who had committed an act of exceptional valor, and honored a man who had stood at his place in the Hoplite phalanx.

The fact that this type of soldier endured for over 350 year, does not mean that they remained fixed and static in development. Figures such as Epaminondas of Thebes and Iphicrates of Athens attempted to reform how Hoplites were employed, and influenced future tactical thinkers.

A Phalangite/Pezhetairoi

2. φαλαγγίτης/πεζεταίροί (Soldier who fights in a Phalanx, Phalangite/ Foot Companions, Pezhetairoi)

Around the  350s B.C.E., a massive power shift came to Aegean world, as a regional kingdom in Northern Greece, Macedon, became the overlord of Greece. It is likely that Macedon's ambitious king, Phillip II, utilized a new type of soldier in order to conquer the Greek mainland.
Ancient sources are somewhat mixed on what to call this new type of soldier. Arrian, the most famous biographer of Alexander "the Great" refers to these men as Pezhetairoi, or "Foot Companions." By contrast, our two other good sources for information on the Hellenistic era, Diodorus Sicilus and Polybius of Megalopolis refer to these men as "Phalangites." That is the term which we will employ in our discussion of these soldiers. These Phalangites used a pike, the σαρίσα, (Sarissa), which was possibly up to 18 feet long, much longer than the dory. While historians disagree on exactly when the Sarissa came into use, it may have been used as early as the Battle of Choronea in 338 B.C.E. The Phalangites formed the Sarrisa Phalanx (an unwieldy term but better than "Phalangite Phalanx"). Macedonian generals arrayed the Sarissa Phalanx at varying depths, with 8, 16, and 32 being some of the most common. Since the Phalangites often used a smaller shield than the Hoplite, they depended on the deep hedge of spears (perhaps 3, 4 or even 5 projecting beyond the front rank of men) in order to defend themselves from enemy attack.

An advancing Sarissa Phalanx

 The picture above shows the awe-inspiring nature of the Sarissa Phalanx- a sight which even terrified veteran Roman commanders. However, as the ancient historian Polybius notes- the Phalanx had a number of drawbacks. It mainly useful in open terrain, when the enemy was already offering to do battle. If the cohesion of the phalanx broke up, it became vulnerable to close attack by sword-wielding infantry. Phillip II, Alexander the Great, and the Successor Kingdom's of Alexander's Empire all employed these Phalangites, often with great success. Like the Hoplite Phalanx before it, the Sarissa Phalanx depended on collective action, and mutual defense.

Once again- these were not the only types of infantry in the Greek world. We will get on to the θυρεοφοροί, θώρακταί, ψίλοί, and others in time. If none of this is new information to you- don't despair. We will get into more technical debates further up in the blog. I want to begin simply by outlining a base set of knowledge, from which we can proceed to more specific ideas.

Thanks for reading,



Alex Burns